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INTRODUCTION
Over the past four years, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has, as it has done since its
establishment in 1982, exercised its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
2
§ 1295(a)(5) to review decisions of the United States Court of
International Trade (“CIT”) regarding U.S. regulation of
international trade. While trade cases currently make up only about
3
six percent of the docket of the Federal Circuit, decisions in these
cases can have a significant discernable impact on the day-to-day
investigation and regulation of trade matters of the three U.S.
agencies featured most prominently in the trade decisions of the
Federal Circuit—United States Customs and Border Protection
(“Customs”), the United States Department of Commerce
(“Commerce”), and the United States International Trade
Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”)—and on the parties involved
in trade disputes before these agencies.
This article covers all cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2006,
and selected cases from 2003-2005, dealing with international trade
matters from tariff classification to investigations of dumping and
subsidies, and jurisdictional issues related to appeals of these matters.
A significant number of the cases that arrive at the Federal Circuit
4
from the CIT are accompanied by a complex history —sometimes
5
described as “a long and tortuous path” —and the case summaries
below highlight the major holdings of each case within the context of
this history and the unique fact patterns encompassing each case.
I.

U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS

As fewer unfair trade investigations involving Commerce and the
ITC were initiated and appealed between 2003 and 2006, customs
enforcement cases represent the largest number of trade regulation
cases decided by the Federal Circuit during this period. Customs has
been an agency within the United States Department of Homeland
Security since 2003. While Customs currently has many functions
2. “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of
International Trade.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000).
3. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
4. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (noting that “[l]ike many appeals from the Court of International Trade, this
appeal has a somewhat complex history”).
5. See Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244, 1245 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (indicating that the dispute began in 1995 and subsequently included
three rulings by the Court of International Trade and one ruling by the Federal
Circuit).
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related to security, as well as trade, the focus of the Customs trade
cases at the Federal Circuit involve Customs’ functions of “[a]ssessing
and collecting Customs duties, excise taxes, fees and penalties due on
6
imported merchandise.” As a result, during 2003-2006 Customs
found itself defending in the Federal Circuit a significant number of
tariff classification decisions and had to defend a wide range of other
customs-related matters, including deemed liquidation, duty
drawback, and Byrd Amendment distributions. In addition, as
discussed below, a large number of 2006 Customs cases involved
jurisdictional issues.
A. Tariff Classification
While the majority of Customs’ tariff classification decisions
necessarily turn on the details of the products being imported,
classification decisions rising to the level of the Federal Circuit
typically address issues with a broader impact on importers than
whether a product fits under one subheading or another of the
7
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). As
shown in the cases described below, 2006 was no exception in this
regard.
8
Motorola, Inc. v. United States involved the tariff classification of
9
eight models of circuits used in battery packs for cellular phones. In
this case, Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”) argued that all eight of its
circuits should be classified under HTSUS subheading 8542.40.00 for
10
“hybrid integrated circuits,” which enter duty-free. Customs had
classified the circuits under subheading 8536.30.80, which carries a
11
duty rate of 3.2% ad valorem. The CIT had sustained Customs’
classification, relying on the HTSUS Explanatory Notes for
12
guidance.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT on this issue,
6. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service—Over 200 Years of
History, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/home.xml (follow “about cbp” hyperlink; then
follow “History” hyperlink; then follow “U.S. Customs Service—Over 200 Years of
History” hyperlink).
7. United States International Trade Commission, Official Harmonized Tariff
Schedule, http://www.usitc.gov (follow “Official Harmonized Tariff Schedule”
hyperlink) (describing the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, the source for establishing
tariff classifications for goods imported into the United States).
8. 436 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
9. Id. at 1358.
10. Id. at 1358-59.
11. See id. at 1359 (stating that the subheading covers “other apparatus for
protecting electrical circuits”).
12. See id. at 1360-61 (noting that the CIT used the Explanatory Notes to the
HTSUS, an “instructive, but not binding” source, to determine that the Motorola
circuits did not meet the “combined . . . indivisibly” requirement of “hybrid
integrated circuits”).
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finding that Motorola had not met its burden in challenging the tariff
classification, and noting that “[b]ecause the court used the
Explanatory Note for guidance as to the meaning of a definitional
term and did not treat the Explanatory Note as setting forth an
additional definitional requirement, we conclude that the trial court
13
did not commit legal error by referring to the Explanatory Note.”
In a second issue in this case, the Federal Circuit confronted
whether some or all of Motorola’s circuits should be entered dutyfree on the grounds that Customs had previously granted the same or
similar circuits duty-free treatment and failed to publish its contrary
14
15
ruling for notice and comment. Here, giving Chevron deference to
16
Customs’ interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), despite the fact that
Customs’ interpretation in 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c)(1)(ii) postdated the
17
events to which the interpretation was applied, the Federal Circuit
ruled that Customs’ expedited “bypass” procedures, in which goods
are admitted pursuant to representations by the importer and are not
independently examined or reviewed, do not constitute “treatment”
18
of the goods. Therefore, the Federal Circuit remanded to the CIT
to address whether the particular entries in this case were processed
19
without review or examination by Customs.
20
In Brother International Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
addressed whether Brother International Corp.’s (“Brother’s”)
misclassification of multifunction centers (“MFCs”), which are office
equipment with multiple functions, such as printing, copying, faxing,
21
and scanning, was due to a mistake of fact or a mistake of law. 19
U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) allows the reliquidation of goods previously
misclassified based on a mistake of fact (but not if the mistake also
22
involved a mistake of law). In this case, Brother entered the MFCs
13. Id. at 1361.
14. Id. at 1362.
15. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (requiring courts to defer to statutory interpretations made by
administrative agencies as long as the interpretations are reasonable).
16. See Motorola, 436 F.3d at 1363-64 (pointing out that 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)
(2000) provides that a proposed Customs interpretive ruling or decision that would
modify or revoke a prior interpretive ruling or decision must first be published in the
Customs Bulletin to allow for comment by interested parties).
17. See id. at 1366 (finding that Chevron deference is appropriate in such
situations as long as the agency’s interpretation is supported by other regulations or
administrative rulings and is not intended to protect past agency action from attack).
18. Id. at 1366-67.
19. Id. at 1368.
20. 464 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
21. Id. at 1320-22.
22. See id. at 1321 (pointing out that despite the repeal of 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c) on
December 3, 2004, the case involves events from 1997, resulting in current
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in 1996 and 1997 with Brother’s customs broker mistakenly
classifying the MFCs under the category for photocopying apparatus
23
Later in 1997, Brother requested a tariff
with a 3.7% duty.
classification for the same type of machine and Customs concluded
that the correct heading was the heading for other laser printer units,
24
a duty free provision. Relying on 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1), Brother
25
requested reliquidation of the earlier entries of MFCs.
Customs
refused and the CIT affirmed, finding that the original
misclassification was due to a combination of a mistake of fact and of
law and therefore ineligible for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C.
26
§ 1520(c)(1). The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the only
mistake was the factual error on the part of the customs broker who
did not know that the essential character of the MFCs was the printer
and that “a mistake of fact that leads to a misclassification is still a
27
mistake of fact.”
As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded the case to the CIT to further remand to Customs so that
Customs could reliquidate the goods and refund the excess duties to
28
Brother.
29
Cummins Inc. v. United States dealt with whether certain crankshafts
classified under HTSUS subheading 8483.1030 undergo a tariff shift
in Mexico (after importation to Mexico from Brazil and before
importation into the United States), thus entitling them to
preferential treatment under the North American Free Trade
30
In this
Agreement (“NAFTA”) as goods originating in Mexico.
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding that the
crankshafts were not entitled to preferential treatment under NAFTA
31
as they were not Mexican in origin.
Under General Notes 12(b)(i)-(iv), 12(b)(ii)(A), 12(t)/84.243(A),
HTSUS, products may be considered to “originate in the territory of
a NAFTA party” if they are “transformed in the territory” of a NAFTA
application of the repealed statute); see also Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 2105, 118 Stat.
2598 (2004) (repealing § 1520(c)).
23. See Brother Int’l, 464 U.S. at 1322-23 (observing that the customs broker could
not determine the MFC’s principal function and thus mistakenly classified the
machines).
24. See id. (finding that despite its multifunction capabilities “the printing
function . . . dictates the principal function of [the] machine”).
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1322-23 (concluding that Brother’s customs broker’s decision to
classify the MFCs under a particular provision of HTSUS and further reliance on a
Customs ruling constituted determinations of law).
27. Id. at 1324.
28. Id.
29. 454 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
30. Id. at 1361-62.
31. Id. at 1363, 1366.
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party, including a transformation by undergoing a “change in tariff
32
classification.” Cummins argued before Customs, the CIT, and the
Federal Circuit that the crankshafts it imports into the United States
undergo a tariff shift in Mexico, and thereby are entitled to
33
preferential duty treatment under NAFTA. Cummins contended
that the proper classification of its crankshafts upon import into
Mexico was heading 7224 as “semifinished products of other alloy
steel,” which have not been further worked beyond being roughly
34
shaped by forging. While the parties disputed the meaning of the
35
term “further worked,” the Federal Circuit looked to its common
and commercial meanings, which it found to be “to form, fashion, or
36
Under this
shape an existing product to a greater extent.”
definition, the Federal Circuit found that the crankshafts were
37
“further worked” before importation into Mexico and that,
moreover, under HTSUS General Rule of Interpretation 2(a) (which
classifies an incomplete or unfinished product as the finished article
if it has the “essential character” of the finished article) the product
“imported into Mexico had the general shape of a crankshaft and was
intended for use only in producing a finished crankshaft,” resulting
in a proper classification of the product under subheading
38
8483.10.30 upon importation into Mexico.
In affirming the CIT’s summary judgment ruling against Cummins,
the Federal Circuit also found that the CIT did not improperly rely
on an opinion of the World Customs Organization (“WCO”) because
the CIT had accorded no deference to the WCO opinion and instead
made its own independent assessment, relying on the WCO opinion
39
only as persuasive authority.
40
In Processed Plastics Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s decision granting summary judgment for the United States
and holding that Customs properly classified two children’s
backpacks and one children’s beach bag under HTSUS subheading
32. Id. at 1361-62.
33. Id. at 1362-63.
34. See id. at 1363-64 (noting that classification under heading 7224 means the
product underwent a tariff shift and is entitled to preferential NAFTA treatment).
35. See id. (stating that if the product had been “further worked” prior to
importation into Mexico, then it could not be classified within heading 7224).
36. Id. at 1365.
37. See id. (determining that the product was forged, trimmed, coined, shot
blasted, milled, and mass centered in Brazil, satisfying the “further worked”
definition).
38. Id. at 1365-66.
39. See id. at 1366 (pointing out that U.S. courts do not give deference to WCO
opinions, but may rely on them as persuasive authority).
40. 473 F.3d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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4202.92.45 (for traveling bags, knapsacks, and backpacks) instead of
41
subheading 9503.70.00 (for certain toys).
The two backpacks were made of polyvinyl chloride plastic sheeting
with plastic mesh on the bottom, contained imprints of “Pooh” and
“Barbie” characters, and were approximately eleven inches high, nine
42
inches wide, and three and a half inches deep. The beach bag was a
vertical cylinder twelve inches high and nine inches in diameter
43
made generally of the same materials as the backpacks. Processed
Plastics Co. (“Processed”) sold the backpacks and bag with an
44
assortment of sand toys inside each bag.
Processed argued in its appeal, and the Federal Circuit agreed, that
the court should use the standard adopted in Minnetonka Brands, Inc.
45
v. United States to determine whether Processed’s merchandise
should be classified as a toy, as the HTSUS does not define the word
46
“toy.” In that case, the CIT determined that the principal use of a
47
“toy” is amusement, diversion, or play rather than practicality.
However, in applying this standard, the Federal Circuit disagreed
with Processed that the seven factors cited in Minnetonka were
definitive in defining a toy, finding instead that the factors were
“simply areas of inquiry that may prove useful in determining what is
48
the principal use of merchandise alleged to be a ‘toy.’” The Federal
Circuit then agreed with the CIT’s finding that Processed failed to
allege facts sufficient to conclude that the primary use of Processed’s
49
merchandise was for play and, therefore, a toy. The Federal Circuit
also agreed with the CIT that there were no genuine issues of
material fact preventing a determination that the merchandise was
properly classified as a backpack under subheading 4202.92.45, since
Processed’s only argument against this classification was that the bags
were limited in how much weight they could carry and heading 4202
50
contains no weight or structural integrity requirement. The Federal
41. Id. at 1167.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1167-68.
44. Id. at 1168.
45. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000). In Minnetoka, the Court of
International Trade held that imported products consisting of hollow plastic bodies
and heads in the shape of cartoon characters used to sell bubble bath were
classifiable as toys, not as plastic bottles and lids for conveyance of goods. The Court
listed seven factors for determining whether an import is of “class or kind” covered
by a particular tariff. Id.
46. Processed, 473 F.3d at 1169.
47. See id. (noting the Federal Circuit’s agreement with the specific Minnetonka
“toy” standard).
48. Id. at 1170.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1171.
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Circuit rejected additional related arguments under General Rules of
Interpretation 1 and 3 of the HTSUS, finding that the items were
51
properly classified under 4202.92.45.
52
In Fujitsu Compound Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision affirming Customs’ denial of
Fujitsu Compound Semiconductor, Inc.’s (“Fujitsu’s”) request for
53
reliquidation of certain imports of laser diode modules.
Fujitsu
imported laser diode modules, which were classified under HTSUS
54
subheading 8541.40.95 with a duty rate of 4.2%, in 1991 and 1992.
In June 1992, in response to a protest by another importer, Customs
changed the classification of laser diode modules to HTSUS
subheading 8541.40.20 with a duty rate of two percent and applied
55
this new classification to unliquidated Fujitsu entries. This appeal
involved Fujitsu entries which were liquidated within ninety days
56
before Customs’ ruling changing the liquidation of the entries.
Fujitsu filed a “Mistake of Fact” petition under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1520(c)(1), arguing that Customs was required to reliquidate its
entries because the entries were not final when the Customs’ ruling
57
was issued, but were within the ninety-day protest period. Here, the
Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that Customs was not required to
58
reliquidate the entries at its own initiative. Instead, the court found
that the burden is on the importer to file a timely protest in order to
obtain the benefit of any post-liquidation rulings during the ninety59
day protest period.
B. Jurisdictional Issues
In two recent cases, the Federal Circuit addressed whether Customs
made a protestable decision conferring jurisdiction on the CIT under
60
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) where Customs liquidated certain merchandise
that might have been entitled to duty-free treatment under NAFTA,
51. See id. at 1172-73 (denying Processed’s argument that the “rule of relative
specificity” in General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) leads to classification as a toy).
52. 363 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
53. Id. at 1231.
54. Id. at 1232.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. (highlighting Fujitsu’s argument that “Customs committed a mistake of
fact by failing sua sponte to reclassify and reliquidate these entries in light of the
[other ruling]”).
58. Id. at 1235.
59. Id.
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) (granting the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over
civil actions challenging denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of
1930).
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but the importer did not make a proper NAFTA claim prior to
liquidation. In both cases, the Federal Circuit determined that an
importer must satisfy the statutory requirements for NAFTA eligibility
in order for Customs to have made a “protestable decision” subject to
61
review by the CIT. In Corrpro Companies, Inc. v. United States, an
importer sought preferential treatment under NAFTA for certain
62
entries of merchandise.
The importer did not make a written
declaration and submit certifications regarding NAFTA treatment, as
63
required under the NAFTA implementing regulation to be done
64
within one year of importation. Nevertheless, the importer filed a
protest to Customs’ liquidation of its merchandise under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1514(a), a procedural mechanism regarding protests of Customs
decisions pertaining to classification, rate, and amount of duties, and
65
claimed duty-free treatment under NAFTA.
While the CIT had
found jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit disagreed, citing the lack of a
66
“protestable decision” by Customs. In particular, the Federal Circuit
held that
[t]here is a protestable decision as to NAFTA eligibility that confers
jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(a) only when the importer has made a valid claim for NAFTA
treatment, either at entry or within a year of entry, with a written
declaration and Certificates of Origin presented in a timely
fashion, and Customs has engaged in ‘some sort of decision67
making process’ expressly considering the merits of that claim.
68

Similarly, in a 2005 decision, Xerox v. United States, the Federal
Circuit held that Customs’ liquidation of an importer’s entries was
not a protestable decision with respect to preferential treatment
under NAFTA where Customs did not consider the merits of NAFTA

61. 433 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
62. Id. at 1362.
63. See 19 C.F.R. § 181.11(a) (2005) (stating that “[a] Certificate of Origin shall
be employed to certify that a good being exported either from the United States into
Canada or Mexico or from Canada or Mexico into the United States qualifies as an
originating good for purposes of preferential tariff treatment under the NAFTA”); 19
C.F.R. § 181.21(a) (2005) (stating that the U.S. importer must make a written
declaration that a good qualifies for treatment under the NAFTA).
64. See 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) (2000) (stating that even if the importer does not
make a NAFTA claim at time of entry, Customs may still grant preferential treatment
under NAFTA if the importer files a written declaration and copies of applicable
Certificates of Origin within one year of importation).
65. See Corrpro, 433 F.3d at 1363 (noting that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) does not
address NAFTA eligibility).
66. Id. at 1365.
67. Id. (quoting U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
68. 423 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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eligibility because the importer did not make a proper claim for
69
NAFTA treatment.
In another Customs appeal involving jurisdictional issues,
70
DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the CIT’s decision denying DaimlerChrysler Corporation’s
(“Daimler’s”) motion to amend its summons to identify seven
71
additional protests of Customs’ decisions that Daimler failed to
72
identify in its original summons. The Federal Circuit agreed with
the CIT that it did not have jurisdiction to review the seven omitted
protests because Daimler did not file its motion to amend within the
73
180 day limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a). In this
case, Daimler appealed a large number of protests with the CIT and
filed an attached schedule of protests with its summons, omitting
seven protests covering more than four hundred entries and ninety74
seven entries from a protest specifically identified in the summons.
When Daimler moved to amend its summons more than 180 days
after receiving notice from Customs of its denial of Daimler’s
protests, the CIT held that, while Daimler could include the ninetyseven omitted entries because jurisdiction attached to the listed
protests, Daimler could not add the seven omitted protests because
75
the CIT was without jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit agreed,
finding that jurisdiction turned on the sufficiency of the summons as
to the omitted protests because the summons must establish the
CIT’s jurisdiction in a protest appeal and each protest forms the basis
76
for a separate cause of action. The Federal Circuit held that each
protest involved in the suit must be specifically identified in order for
jurisdiction to attach to those protests, and where, as here, the
protests were not specifically identified, the CIT lacked jurisdiction
77
over those protests. The Federal Circuit also noted that typical res
judicata rules do not apply in protest cases, meaning that protests
may intentionally be omitted from a summons in order to preserve
the opportunity to relitigate issues regarding the classification of
78
merchandise in a later suit.
As a result, there is no fair notice
69. Id. at 1357-58.
70. 442 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
71. Id. at 1314 (noting that “[u]nder section 515 of the Tariff Act, an importer
may challenge Customs’ liquidation of imports including classification of
merchandise under the HTSUS, by filing a ‘protest’ with Customs”).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1322-23.
74. Id. at 1316.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1317-18.
77. Id. at 1319.
78. Id. at 1321.
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regarding a protest appeal unless it is specifically identified in the
79
summons during the 180-day appeal window.
80
In Forest Products Northwest, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the holding of the Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) that the
CFC did not have jurisdiction over Forest Products Northwest, Inc.’s
(“Forest Products’”) claim for a refund of antidumping and
81
countervailing duties paid to Customs.
Forest Products had
imported two shipments of lumber from Canada in October 2003
and, as both entries were allegedly subject to antidumping and
countervailing duties, had paid estimated duties at the time of
82
importation. Forest Products then sued the United States in the
CFC, arguing that Customs misclassified the subject imports, that
83
Customs violated the Customs Modernization Act by failing to
adhere to another Customs ruling, and that Customs should not have
applied the antidumping and countervailing duty orders to Forest
84
Products’ imports. The government filed a motion to dismiss for
85
Forest Products
lack of jurisdiction, which the CFC granted.
86
appealed this dismissal to the Federal Circuit.
In affirming the decision of the CFC, the Federal Circuit noted that
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(c), specifically excludes from the
CFC’s jurisdiction any civil action within the exclusive jurisdiction of
87
the CIT. In addition, in order for Forest Products to sue in the CFC,
it must assert an independent contractual relationship, constitutional
provision, federal statute, or executive agency regulation that
88
provides a substantive right to money damages. Since a substantive
right to money damages in cases involving antidumping or
countervailing duty orders (such as might be initially addressed in a
Commerce administrative review determination or Commerce scope
ruling) or Customs’ liquidation of entries (such as might be
addressed in a protest to Customs) are under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the CIT, as are any other federal statutes or
79. Id. at 1321-22.
80. 453 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
81. Id. at 1356-57.
82. See id. at 1357 (noting that Forest Products paid the duties “under protest”).
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1625 (2000).
84. Forest Prods., 453 F.3d at 1357.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1359. However, the CFC has jurisdiction over “any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
88. Forest Prods., 453 F.3d at 1359.
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constitutional provisions relating to a substantive right to monetary
damages over duties upon importation, Forest Products’ claims are
89
not within the jurisdiction of the CFC.
In yet another jurisdictional decision, International Custom Products,
90
Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit concluded that the CIT
lacked jurisdiction over International Custom Products, Inc.’s
(“ICP’s”) complaint regarding Customs’ classification decision for
91
ICP’s imports of white sauce. Prior to beginning importation of its
white sauce, ICP received a letter ruling from Customs classifying the
sauce under one heading in January 1999, but, based on a tariff rate
investigation in 2004, Customs classified unliquidated ICP entries
under a different tariff heading in 2005, resulting in a substantially
92
increased tariff rate. Customs then liquidated the entries under that
heading. ICP did not file a protest of the liquidation with Customs,
but instead appealed to the CIT, arguing that Customs’ actions
violated 19 U.S.C. § 1925(c)(1) or (2) by effectively revoking the 1999
93
letter ruling without proper procedures. The CIT found that it had
94
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4).
The Federal Circuit disagreed. The court found that the proper
review of Customs’ actions is through a protest, with review of protest
denials available by the CIT under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) jurisdiction
unless such jurisdiction would be “manifestly inadequate,” in which
95
case residual jurisdiction is available under § 1581(i). ICP alleged:
(1) financial hardship; (2) a lack of prospective relief; (3) delays in
96
proceeding under § 1581(a); and (4) futility of a protest. However,
the Federal Circuit found that following the protest procedures
would not have been manifestly inadequate because: (1) financial
hardship does not make Congress’s remedy inadequate; (2) the court
would not assume that Customs would disregard a court ruling on
current imports when classifying in the future; (3) “delays inherent in
the statutory process do not render it manifestly inadequate;” and
(4) it is not for the plaintiff to determine whether it would be futile to
97
protest or not. Therefore, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to

89. Id. at 1359-60.
90. 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1326.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 824 F.2d
356, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
96. Id. at 1327-28.
97. Id.
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the CIT with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of
98
jurisdiction.
99
In Retamal v. United States Customs and Border Protection, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the CIT did not have jurisdiction over a suit
involving Customs’ revocation of a customhouse broker’s license after
the broker failed to file his triennial status report in a timely
100
manner.
The broker contended that the CIT had jurisdiction
under the CIT’s residual jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i),
but the Federal Circuit found that, because the broker’s claims did
not relate to the “administration and enforcement” of a matter
referred to in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) or in § 1581(i)(1)-(3),
§ 1581(i)(4) could not provide an independent ground for
101
jurisdiction.
C. Deemed Liquidation
Two 2005 Federal Circuit opinions addressed the issue of “deemed
liquidation” under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). The first, NEC Solutions
102
(America), Inc. v. United States, addressed the issue of the timing of
“deemed liquidation.” In this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT’s conclusions that the period for “deemed liquidation” was
triggered when Customs received an e-mail liquidation notice from
Commerce, and that service on the United States Department of
103
Justice did not constitute “notice” to Customs.
19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) requires Customs to liquidate entries within six
months of receiving notice that suspension of liquidation of the
104
entries has been removed.
If Customs does not liquidate the
entries within this six month period, the entries are deemed
105
liquidated at the rate asserted upon entry. In this case, the parties
disputed whether an e-mail message sent to Customs regarding
entries of NEC Solutions (America), Inc. (“NEC”) of Japanese
television sets subject to an antidumping duty order was sufficient
106
“notice” to trigger deemed liquidation after six months. The court
found that the e-mail notice was sufficient because it was
98. Id. at 1328.
99. 439 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1375.
102. 411 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 1347.
104. Id. at 1344 (observing also that the notice must be sufficiently unambiguous
of the fact that the suspension of liquidation has been lifted, but it need not include
specific liquidation instructions).
105. Id. (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
106. Id.
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unambiguous, despite lacking specific language about the removal of
107
the suspension of liquidation. The Federal Circuit held that
[n]either the statute nor our precedent requires that the notice
give explicit instructions to liquidate or use particular language in
order to provide notice that the removal of suspension has
occurred . . . . [and] neither the statute nor our precedent requires
that the duty rate be included in the notice in order to satisfy the
108
requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).

The Federal Circuit also found that “Commerce’s intent and the
bureaucratic difficulty of conveying Commerce’s intent are
109
irrelevant.” Finally, in response to an NEC argument that Customs
received constructive notice of the lifting of suspension of liquidation
for later reviews, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT and held
“that service of an opinion to attorneys at [the] Justice [Department]
110
does not constitute constructive notice to Customs.”
111
International Trading Co. v. United States also dealt with the issue of
deemed liquidation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d). In this case, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination that the period for
deemed liquidation of entries subject to an administrative review of
an antidumping duty order is first triggered when Commerce
publishes its final results of administrative review in the Federal
Register, even if Commerce later issues explicit liquidation
112
instructions to Customs.
Because Customs failed to liquidate
International Trading Company’s entries of shop towels until more
than six months after Commerce published the final results of its
administrative review, in which it calculated antidumping duties on
this type of towel at 27.31%, the entries were deemed liquidated at
113
the cash deposit rate at the time of entry, or 2.72%.
D. Byrd Amendment
Candle Corp. of America v. United States International Trade
114
Commission presented the issue of whether a company that opposed
an antidumping investigation was entitled to receive offset
107. Id. at 1345 (citing several phrases from the e-mail and announcing “[w]e read
these provisions of the e-mail and the e-mail as a whole as giving notice to Customs
that there was nothing preventing the entries of NEC from being liquidated, and
thus, that the suspension of liquidation had been removed”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1346.
110. Id. at 1347.
111. 412 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
112. Id. at 1313.
113. Id. at 1305-06, 1313.
114. 374 F.3d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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distributions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act,
19 U.S.C. § 1675c (“Byrd Amendment”) by acquiring U.S. businesses
115
that would have been entitled to Byrd Amendment distributions.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT in finding that such companies
116
were not entitled to the distributions.
Under the Byrd Amendment, “affected domestic producers” may
receive distributions of antidumping duties imposed on foreign
117
producers.
“Affected domestic producers” must either be
118
The
petitioners or interested parties who supported the petition.
statute also provides that “[c]ompanies, businesses, or persons that
have ceased the production of the product covered by the order or
finding or who have been acquired by a company or business that is
related to a company that opposed the investigation shall not be an
119
affected domestic producer.”
In this case, Candle Corporation of America (“CCA”) did not
support the antidumping duty petition against petroleum wax
candles from the People’s Republic of China because it imported
120
candles subject to the investigation.
However, CCA later acquired
substantially all of the assets of two companies that had supported the
petition and sought to receive Byrd Amendment distributions on
121
their behalf, which Customs refused.
122
Finding the statutory language ambiguous, the Federal Circuit
looked to the purpose of the relevant section of the Byrd
Amendment: “to bar opposers of antidumping investigations from
securing payments either directly or through the acquisition of
supporting parties” to determine that CCA was not entitled to receive
123
The Federal Circuit held that the Byrd
Byrd Amendment funds.
Amendment barred “claims on behalf of otherwise affected domestic
producers if those producers were acquired by a company that
opposed the investigation or were acquired by a business related to a
124
company that opposed the investigation.” The Federal Circuit also
found that “[t]his barrier exists whether the claim is made by the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 1094.
19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a) (2000).
Id. § 1675c(b)(1).
Id.
Candle Corp. of Am., 374 F.3d at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
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acquiring company on behalf of the acquired entities or by the
125
acquired entities themselves.”
In another Byrd Amendment case, Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. United
126
States, the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s judgment granting
Dixon Ticonderoga Company’s (“Dixon’s”) motion for judgment on
127
The Federal Circuit found that the
the administrative record.
record contained no evidence that Dixon was substantially prejudiced
by Customs’ failure to publish a timely notice of intention to
distribute duties under the Byrd Amendment as required by 19 C.F.R.
128
§ 159.62(a).
Under the Byrd Amendment and related regulations, Customs is
required to publish a Notice of Intent to Distribute duties (“Notice”)
at least thirty days before the distribution of a continued dumping
and subsidy offset, to publish the Notice at least ninety days before
the end of the fiscal year, and to make distributions within sixty days
129
after the fiscal year. Parties seeking a share of the distribution have
sixty days from the date of the Notice to file the required
130
In this case, Customs
certifications to receive a distribution.
published its 2003 Notice seventy-eight days prior to the end of the
fiscal year and twelve days after the regulatory deadline, while Dixon
131
filed its certifications 102 days after Customs published the Notice.
Customs then denied Dixon’s application to receive a Byrd
132
Amendment distribution.
On appeal, although the CIT
determined that the regulatory timing requirements were merely
procedural aids, the CIT nevertheless held that Dixon was prejudiced
by Customs’ failure to meet its regulatory timing requirements and
133
entered judgment for Dixon.
The Federal Circuit reversed because Dixon had provided no
evidence that it requested an extension or that its failure to file a
timely application was caused by Customs’ late publication of the
134
notice.
The court found that the CIT’s decision had effectively
eliminated the prejudice requirement when an agency misses a
135
statutory or regulatory deadline.
125. Id.
126. 468 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1354.
129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(c), (d)(2); 19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) (2003).
130. 19 C.F.R. § 159.63(a) (2003).
131. Dixon Ticonderoga Co., 468 F.3d at 1354-55.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1355.
134. Id. at 1356 (analogizing to PAM, S.p.A. v. United States, 463 F.3d 1345 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)).
135. Id. at 1357.
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E. Other Customs Issues
136

In Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s decision affirming, in part, Customs’ decisions denying
Saab Cars USA, Inc.’s (“Saab’s”) protest of decisions denying duty
137
allowances for defective imported automobiles.
Saab had filed a
protest with Customs pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 seeking an
allowance against import duties for the value of certain automobiles
imported from Saab’s Swedish parent company where the
automobiles allegedly contained “latent defects” discovered after
138
importation. Under 19 C.F.R. § 158.12, importers may receive such
an allowance for “[m]erchandise . . . found by the port director to be
139
partially damaged at the time of importation.” The Federal Circuit
found that the words “at the time of importation” modify the phrase
140
Therefore, the
“partially damaged” and not the verb “found.”
Federal Circuit held that “the regulation permits allowances for
merchandise that the port director finds, at any time, to have been
141
partially damaged at the time of importation.”
Nevertheless, the lower court had rejected virtually all of Saab’s
claims pursuant to an earlier series of cases that set forth three
requirements for an importer to claim an allowance under 19 C.F.R.
§ 158.12: (1) show that the importer contracted for “defect-free”
merchandise; (2) link the defective merchandise to specific entries;
142
and (3) prove the amount of the allowance for each entry.
The
143
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision, finding that Saab had
provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate its entitlement to
allowances for over-appraisals of damaged merchandise for some
144
portions of its claims. In particular, the Federal Circuit agreed with
the CIT that Saab’s information about its port repair claims (close in
136. 434 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
137. Id. at 1361.
138. Id. at 1362.
139. 19 C.F.R. § 158.12(a) (2005).
140. Saab, 434 F.3d at 1369.
141. Id. at 1369-70.
142. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 2d 942 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999).
143. The issue of the correct standard of review for judgment issued on stipulated
facts in lieu of trial, as occurred in this case, was an issue of first impression for this
court. The Federal Circuit determined that a judgment issued on stipulated facts in
lieu of trial resembles a decision on the administrative record and is determinatively
different than summary judgment for standard of review purposes. The Federal
Circuit held that it reviews the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and reviews
inferences the lower court drew from the stipulated facts, and its application of the
law to those facts, for clear error. Saab, 434 F.3d at 1372.
144. Id. at 1372-74.
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time to importation) was sufficient to establish that the automobile
145
defects were present at the time of importation, while the evidence
about warranty repairs did not necessarily indicate damage that
existed at the time of importation, and therefore did not, with limited
exceptions, meet the requirements for an allowance under 19 C.F.R.
146
§ 158.12.
147
United States v. Ford Motor Co. (“Ford I”) was the first of two cases
decided by the Federal Circuit in 2006 regarding Ford Motor
Company’s (“Ford’s”) alleged misrepresentations of import entries.
In this case, in which the CIT imposed a fine of over $17,000,000, the
Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
148
further proceedings.
The CIT held that Ford knowingly violated affirmative
requirements by omitting information required by 19 U.S.C. § 1484
149
for Customs to assess proper duties on imports.
In particular, the
CIT held that Ford had failed to provide information about
“assists”—design or engineering work done overseas, not factored
into the invoice price, but still subject to import duties and “lumpsum payments”—payments by the importer to the seller that are in
150
addition to the original price and are subject to import duties.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that 19 U.S.C. § 1484 does
require that importers disclose variable pricing agreements relating
to entries because a non-final declared value is not one upon which
151
Customs can assess the correct duty. However, the Federal Circuit
also held that Ford should not be penalized for violating this
requirement because the duty to disclose was not widely known and
Customs’ practice requiring disclosure was unclear when Ford made
152
its import entries.
At the same time, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding
that Ford had made assists between 1987 and 1992 and that Ford
negligently failed to declare the assists on its entry documents or “at
153
once” thereafter. The Federal Circuit also affirmed that Ford failed
to comply with the “at once” requirement regarding lump-sum

145. Id. at 1374.
146. Id. at 1375.
147. 463 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
148. Id. at 1271.
149. Id. at 1273.
150. Id. at 1271, 1273.
151. Id. at 1275.
152. Id. at 1275-76 (holding that due process considerations precluded imposing
penalties on Ford).
153. Id. at 1276-77.
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payments under 19 U.S.C. § 1485.
The Federal Circuit based its
holding regarding assists and lump-sum payments in part on Ford’s
failure to raise certain arguments until late in the proceedings and in
part on the unambiguous deadline in a Ford-Customs agreement
155
regarding lump-sum payments.
The Federal Circuit also ruled that 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4), which
provides a safe harbor for disclosures of import law violations “before,
or without knowledge of, the commencement of a formal
156
investigation,” did not provide Ford a safe harbor where Ford was
presumed to know about the scope of a Customs investigation of Ford
157
following a meeting with Customs.
The court found that Ford
158
presented no evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption.
In addition, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT erred when it
included, in the calculation of penalties, entries relating to any model
year after 1991 as such entries were not included in the scope of
159
Customs’ investigation.
Also on the subject of penalties, the
Federal Circuit remanded the issue of multi-year tenders to
determine which portion of the tenders related to the model years
160
under investigation.
The Federal Circuit addressed the dutiability of Ford’s purchase
payments for certain automobiles for import where the price for each
161
vehicle depended on the number of vehicles. The Federal Circuit
ultimately held that payments made pursuant to this “shortfall”
provision were dutiable, basing its holding on its finding that the
“shortfall” payments were part of the price “actually paid or payable”
162
for the vehicles under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1).
Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that the CIT had not
abused its discretion when it imposed the maximum penalty
permitted by the statute, subject to the Federal Circuit’s adjustments
163
discussed above.
In a companion Ford case decided on the same day as Ford I, United
164
States v. Ford Motor Co. (“Ford II”), the Federal Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part the CIT’s finding that Ford was liable for
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1276-77.
19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4) (2000).
Ford I, 463 F.3d at 1281.
Id.
Id. at 1282-83.
Id.
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1285-86. See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text.
463 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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$3,000,000 (plus interest) for Ford’s “grossly negligent
165
misrepresentation” of the value of certain import entries. This case
involved duties paid on certain items for the 1990 Lincoln Town car,
where the initial purchase order was modified over several years due
166
to design changes.
As in Ford I, the Federal Circuit held that due process precluded
the imposition of liability for Ford’s failure to disclose its provisional
pricing arrangement as neither 19 U.S.C. § 1484 nor the applicable
167
regulations clearly required such disclosure.
Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit in Ford II held that Ford’s certification at the time of
entry that the values were “true and correct” was a violation of 19
U.S.C. § 1484 because Ford had sufficient information about the true
168
value of the declared entries as of the date of entry. As a result, the
court affirmed the CIT’s finding that Ford’s violation was one of gross
169
negligence.
The Federal Circuit also held, as had the CIT, that Ford violated 19
U.S.C. § 1485 because Ford failed to answer Customs’ forms fully and
failed to promptly disclose information about design changes and
170
their effect on dutiable value. The Federal Circuit also affirmed the
CIT’s holding that Ford’s violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1485 was grossly
171
negligent.
As in Ford I, the Federal Circuit ruled that Ford did not qualify
under the 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4) safe harbor provision because the
CIT’s determination that Ford had knowledge of Customs’
172
investigation prior to any disclosures was not clearly erroneous.
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s denial of Ford’s
motion to amend its answer to add a counterclaim for overpayments
173
made on its entries. The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that
the motion was futile since de novo review under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)
does not allow consideration of issues unrelated to the investigation
174
that identified the violation in a penalty proceeding.
175
In Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
CIT’s decision ordering Customs to release for entry certain Jazz
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id. at 1289.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1296-98.
Id.
439 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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Photo Corporation (“Jazz”) disposable cameras from two shipments
denied entry by Customs and ordering Customs to allow Jazz to
176
segregate the two shipments under Customs’ supervision. This was
the fourth case to reach the Federal Circuit involving Jazz’s
177
importation of the disposable cameras.
Earlier cases involved
complaints of patent infringement and resulted in a decision by the
Federal Circuit that there was no infringement of Fuji Photo Film
Co., Ltd.’s (“Fuji’s”) patent for the importation of cameras where the
patent right was exhausted by first sale in the United States, and
where the cameras were permissibly repaired using eight steps
178
described in the earlier opinion. Infringement of Fuji’s patents was
found for the importation of other disposable cameras and those
179
cameras were excluded from importation into the United States.
This appeal involved Customs’ decision to exclude two Jazz
shipments of disposable cameras that had been initially
manufactured by Fuji or one of its licensees and were refurbished
180
before importation into the United States in 2004. Upon appeal,
the CIT held that Jazz’s cameras processed using shells from one
collector were first sold in the United States and permissibly repaired
and should be released by Customs, while shells from another
collector did not meet the same standard and were properly
181
excluded. The CIT based its decision on factual findings regarding
182
permissible repair, first sale, and segregation.
Upon appeal to the Federal Circuit by the U.S. Government and
Fuji, the Federal Circuit found that the CIT did not err in holding
that Jazz satisfied the first sale defense for the subject cameras using
183
one collector’s shells.
Following its holding in Jazz I that the
176. Id.
177. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(holding Jazz Photo Corp. liable for willful infringement of Fuji patents); Fuji Photo
Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (imposing a
$13,675,000 penalty on Jazz Photo Corp. for violating the Exclusion Order); Jazz
Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Jazz I), 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(upholding an Exclusion Order against the importation of certain lens fitted film
packages (“LFFPs”) by the twenty-six respondents who had infringed on fourteen
patents owned by Fuji, but excluding LFFPs which were first sold in the United
States).
178. Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States (Jazz IV), 439 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citing Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1110).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1347 (detaining the shipments based on an Exclusion Order against
Jazz for previous infringement of Fuji patents).
181. See id. at 1348 (distinguishing between shipments based on whether the
LFFPs were first sold in the United States).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1352-53 (finding that Jazz proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that eighty-five percent of its shells used by Photo Recycling, a Jazz
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“unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the
patentee, ‘exhausts’ the patentee’s right to control further sale and
use of that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first
sold,” the court evaluated evidence that the collector obtained its
shells in the United States (including circumstantial evidence), and
concluded that the CIT’s conclusions were not factually or legally
184
erroneous. The Federal Circuit also held that the subject cameras
were permissibly repaired under the Jazz I eight step standard
because the repair steps, including the addition of other minor
185
operations, did not make a new single use camera.
The Federal Circuit also held that the CIT did not err in ordering
Customs to supervise Jazz’s segregation of its disposable cameras into
those allowed entry and those excluded because the cameras were in
a Customs warehouse and Customs is obligated to supervise certain
186
activities in its warehouse pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 19.4(b)(1).
Finally, the court held that the CIT did not err in denying Fuji
intervener status because Fuji was denied the ability to intervene
187
under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j).
188
In Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CFC’s holding that Acadia Technology Inc. and Global Win
Technology, Ltd. (collectively, “Acadia”) had failed to state a claim
189
on which relief could be granted. Acadia attempted to import over
twenty thousand computer cooling fans into the United States in
190
After receiving a letter from Underwriters
1997 and 1998.
Laboratories (“UL”) that Acadia’s fans bore UL’s testing trademark
without authorization, Customs seized the shipments, which were
191
ultimately held for four years until a forfeiture action was dismissed.
collector, were purchased in the same location in the United States, and that the trial
court’s application of “presumption of regularity” was not in error where the
government provided nothing to contradict the presumption that no infringing
shells were collected).
184. Id. at 1350 (quoting Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1005).
185. Id. at 1353-55 (permitting the refurbishment of patented products if it merely
involved the replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, and
emphasizing that the minor violations did not include impermissible full back
replacements).
186. Id. at 1355-56 (emphasizing that 19 C.F.R. § 19.4(b)(1) makes supervision by
Customs mandatory and that such supervision would not impose “significant
administrative demands” on Customs).
187. Id. at 1357 (holding additionally that Fuji did not have to be joined as a
necessary party under U.S. CT. INT’L TRADE R. 19 as the government was charged with
protecting Fuji’s patent rights).
188. 458 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1328.
191. See id. at 1329 (noting that while Acadia initially filed for dismissal in 1998,
the U.S. Department of Justice did not promptly file the request).
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At the time of the dismissal, the fans had become obsolete and were
192
valuable only for scrap. Acadia therefore filed an action in the CFC
arguing that the government’s actions violated the Takings Clause of
193
the Fifth Amendment and that Acadia was entitled to recover the
194
lost value of the fans as compensation for the taking.
The CFC granted the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to
195
state a claim.
The Federal Circuit affirmed. As an initial matter,
the Federal Circuit noted that, for takings purposes, it must “assume
196
that the government conduct at issue was not unlawful.” Here, the
court held that Customs’ “seizure of goods suspected of bearing
counterfeit marks is a classic example of the government’s exercise of
the police power to condemn contraband or noxious goods, an
exercise that has not been regarded as a taking for public use for
197
which compensation must be paid.”
Therefore, while the CFC
could hear takings cases, Acadia’s allegations did not give rise to a
198
takings claim.
Regarding the government’s delay in returning the
fans, the Federal Circuit held that this was a potential due process
violation, but that the CFC lacks jurisdiction over due process claims
199
for money damages against the United States.
200
the Federal
In California Industrial Products, Inc. v. United States,
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision granting California Industrial
Products, Inc.’s (“CIP’s”) motion for summary judgment, finding that
Customs erred when it denied CIP manufacturing substitution
drawbacks for CIP’s exportation of steel scrap under 19 U.S.C.
201
§ 1313(b).
The CIT’s decision was based on Customs’ failure to
provide notice and comment proceedings required under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1625(c) when its denial of CIP’s claims resulted in a modification of

192. See id. (tracing the reduction in the value of the fans from $125,130 at the
time of seizure to $41,000 at the time they were returned).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
194. Acadia Tech., Inc., 458 F.3d at 1330 (arguing that the taking was not
authorized by statute and that the delay in returning the goods was unreasonable,
therefore a taking).
195. Id. at 1330.
196. Id. at 1331 (limiting the court’s takings analysis to whether the government’s
actions were a taking for which compensation would be paid).
197. Id. at 1332 (alluding to the general risk owners of property take because of
the State’s control of commercial activity).
198. Id. at 1331-32 (analogizing to property seized in a foreclosure proceeding
and subsequently restored to the owner, which by rule is not a taking).
199. Id. at 1333-34 (contending that an owner of seized property has a due process
right to have “the government return the property or initiate foreclosure
proceedings without unreasonable delay”).
200. 436 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
201. Id.
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previously favorable treatment to substantially identical transactions
202
by other companies.
This appeal arose under 19 U.S.C. § 1313, which provides for a
partial refund of duties, called a drawback, for manufacturers who
subsequently export or destroy imported merchandise on which they
203
have paid duties.
Section 1313(b) additionally allows
manufacturing substitution drawbacks whereby a manufacturer
receives a drawback upon substituting goods of the same “kind and
204
quality” as the goods originally imported. In order to simplify this
process, Customs offers general manufacturing drawback contracts
through which manufacturers may receive drawbacks after meeting
the requirements of the contract and submitting a letter to Customs
205
indicating their intent to comply with the requirements.
This
appeal also dealt with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), which requires notice and
comment procedures before issuing an interpretive ruling that
206
changes a pre-existing “treatment.”
Under regulations issued in
2002, Customs limited certain “substantially identical transactions”
requiring § 1625(c) “treatment” to only the transactions of the
207
person requesting the “treatment.”
Under this statutory framework, CIP sought to obtain drawbacks
for steel trim or scrap it produced in its steel conversion mills that
208
manufacture flat-rolled steel sheet products.
CIP filed a letter of
intent to comply with a general Customs drawback contract for
manufactured steel articles and filed drawback claims pursuant to
209
that contract. Customs denied CIP’s claims, stating that drawback is
not allowed on scrap and basing its denial on a new headquarters
ruling letter in response to the drawback claims of another company,
despite having previously liquidated drawbacks for steel scrap for
202. Id. at 1343 (holding that “Customs was bound by this previous favorable
treatment”).
203. Id.
204. Id. (highlighting that 19 U.S.C. § 1313(b) limits the availability of drawback
to within three years of the receipt of the imported merchandise).
205. Id. at 1344 (mentioning 19 C.F.R. §§ 191.2(f), 191.42 which provide that
Customs’ acknowledgment of receipt of the letter of intent validates the general
contract for fifteen years and permits manufacturers thereafter to submit individual
claims for drawback based on the general contract).
206. Id. (providing thirty days after publication for interested parties to submit
comments on the proposal and another thirty days for the Secretary to issue a final
decision).
207. 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2000).
208. Cal. Indus. Prods., 436 F.3d at 1345 (recalling that CIP’s steel at issue in the
case was purchased from domestic companies and therefore import duties on such
steel were already paid).
209. Id. at 1346 (referring to T.D. 81-74, which specifically disallowed drawback
for any waste resulting from the exported articles).
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210

other companies.
Customs then began denying all claims for
211
drawbacks on steel scrap.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1625(c) that Customs was required to conduct notice and comment
proceedings before changing its practice through the headquarters
212
ruling letter. In affirming, the Federal Circuit found that Customs
did issue an “interpretive ruling or decision” to CIP, as required for
213
the application of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).
In addition, the Federal
Circuit held that the language of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) indicated that
Congress intended that transactions between Customs and multiple
214
parties be “substantially identical transactions.”
Contrary to
Customs’ 2002 regulations, the Federal Circuit found that “use of the
words ‘interested parties’ indicates that Congress intended, contrary
to 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c)(1)(iii)(A), that ‘substantially identical
transactions’ forming the basis of a ‘treatment’ include transactions
other than transactions of just the person before Customs claiming
215
the right to a notice and comment process.”
The Federal Circuit
found that Customs could still change its treatment, but that it was
required to use notice and comment procedures pursuant to 19
216
U.S.C. § 1625(c) before changing the treatment.
II. TRADE REMEDY LAWS
A. U.S. Department of Commerce
The United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), along
with the ITC, is responsible for conducting antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations. In an antidumping investigation,
210. Id. (noting that the headquarter ruling stated that scrap was waste, therefore
disallowed from drawback).
211. Id. (discussing the successful appeal by Precision, another steel corporation,
to the CIT of Customs’ denial of a portion of its drawback claims, in which the Court
determined that Customs’ grant of drawbacks for the majority of the corporation’s
claims constituted a “treatment,” by which Customs was bound).
212. Id. at 1350.
213. Id. at 1351 (characterizing Customs’ March 13, 1998 protest review decision
as within the meaning of “ruling and decision” in 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)).
214. Id. at 1353-56 (noting that while “substantially identical transactions” was not
defined by statute, congressional intent was clear based on reading the statute as a
whole and legislative intent to create transparency of Customs’ actions, and referring
to pre-existing law at the time of the creation of the statute, which provided that
“treatment” included transactions of multiple parties).
215. Id. at 1354 (reasoning that the previous treatment of Precision, permitting
drawback on steel scrap, was a “substantially identical transaction” such that CIP had
the right to a notice and comment process under § 1625(c)).
216. Id. (comparing the current statute to its predecessor, 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c),
which required publication of notice in the Federal Register each time Customs was
reviewing a potential change of position).
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Commerce determines whether the imports subject to the
217
investigation are, or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value. In a
countervailing duty investigation, Commerce determines whether a
government or public entity is providing a countervailable subsidy
regarding the manufacture, export, or production of a product
218
subject to investigation. A finding of dumping or a countervailable
subsidy at a margin that is more than de minimis, when combined
with an affirmative ITC finding, as discussed below, results in the
imposition of an antidumping or countervailing duty order.
Commerce also conducts annual administrative reviews of existing
antidumping and countervailing duty orders to determine the actual
margin of liability for imports subject to the order over the prior year,
as well as other proceedings, such as scope inquiries and changed
circumstances reviews, upon request. In addition, Commerce, along
with the ITC, conducts mandatory five-year reviews of existing orders
with Commerce determining whether the revocation of an
antidumping or countervailing duty order would lead to the
continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidization.
The cases discussed below touch on the range of Commerce’s
responsibilities in administering U.S. unfair trade laws. During 20032006, the Federal Circuit addressed aspects of Commerce’s
calculation of antidumping and countervailing duty margins, the
division of responsibility between Commerce and Customs, issues
involving Commerce’s liquidation instructions, and jurisdictional
issues in appeals of Commerce unfair trade determinations.
219
In Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the CIT’s decision to remand Commerce’s administrative review
determination regarding cylindrical roller bearings from, inter alia,
Germany and to investigate Timken U.S. Corporation and Timken
Nadellager, GmbH’s (“Timken’s”) evidence supporting correction of
220
alleged errors associated with Timken’s home market sales.
In
addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s support of
Commerce’s subsequent redetermination and refusal to correct the
221
alleged errors on remand.
This case involved Commerce’s tenth
annual administrative review and included bearings imported by
222
Timken to the United States. It is perhaps most interesting for its
217. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (2000).
218. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1) (2000).
219. 434 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 1347 (referring to section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which
provides for periodic reviews of antidumping duty orders, 19 U.S.C. § 1481).
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clarification of earlier Federal Circuit decisions regarding
Commerce’s ability to correct importer errors.
In Commerce’s original investigation, Commerce requested that
Timken identify the channels of distribution for its home market
223
sales.
Timken categorized its sales into five channels, which were
subsequently redesignated by Commerce in its preliminary results
into three categories based on whether the point at which selling
224
activities occurred was distinguishable.
After reviewing
Commerce’s preliminary results, Timken argued to Commerce that
Timken had made certain “clerical” errors in reporting its sales and
submitted invoices and purchase orders for the allegedly
225
miscategorized sales.
In its final results, Commerce refused to
226
change its preliminary results. Using a test established in an earlier
case, Commerce decided not to make Timken’s corrections because
it found that the errors were not clerical and that the new
227
information was not reliable.
On appeal, the CIT remanded to
Commerce (although agreeing that Timken’s error was not
“clerical”) because the court was concerned that Commerce’s
application of its test would result in a grossly erroneous dumping
margin and because it was unclear what evidence contradicted
228
On remand, Commerce noted its
Timken’s new evidence.
disagreement with the CIT, but nevertheless reviewed Timken’s new
evidence and found that the use of this information would not result
in a more accurate dumping margin because the new information
was not sufficiently supported, whereas Commerce had verified the
229
original information.
The CIT affirmed Commerce’s
redetermination.
In its review of this case, the Federal Circuit first disagreed with the
government that the CIT erred in remanding the case for further
223. Id.
224. See id. (reclassifying the channels based on an examination of Timken’s
“selling activities, the point in the channel of distribution at which the selling
activities occurred, and the types of customers that purchased the subject bearings”).
225. See id. at 1347-48 (identifying seventeen transactions as channel one instead
of channel two and three, which ultimately resulted in an inaccurate dumping
margin).
226. See id. at 1348 (asserting that the new information conflicted with
information in the record and that the late submission of the new information
prevented Commerce from verifying it).
227. See id. (citing Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia; Final Results of
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,833 (Aug. 19, 1996))
(discussing a two-part test for determining whether to substitute the new information
and recalculate the dumping margin in which the substitution can be made if the
error is clerical and the new evidence is reliable).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1348-49.
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230

investigation.
The Federal Circuit rejected the government’s
bright-line rule regarding what kinds of errors may be corrected in
the context of antidumping duty determinations and clarified that its
holdings regarding limitations on the correction of importer errors
231
in NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States and Alloy Piping Products, Inc. v.
232
United States, on which the government had relied, were “premised
233
exclusively on timeliness.”
The Federal Circuit additionally held
“that Commerce is free to correct any type of importer error—
clerical, methodology, substantive, or one in judgment—in the
context of making an antidumping duty determination, provided that
the importer seeks correction before Commerce issues its final results
234
and adequately proves the need for the requested corrections.”
Regarding the substance of Timken’s requested reclassification of
its home market sales, the Federal Circuit found that, while a “close
case,” Timken’s new evidence was not strong enough to require
235
reclassification.
The court reviewed the evidence in detail and
found that Commerce’s rejection of each piece of evidence was
reasonable as much of the evidence was unsubstantiated, while the
evidence supporting Commerce’s original determination was
236
substantial.
237
In Royal Thai Government v. United States, the Federal Circuit
addressed Commerce’s investigation of countervailable subsidies to
238
the Thai steel industry. Here, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT
holdings: (1) affirming Commerce’s determination that Sahaviriya
Steel Industries Public Company Limited’s (“SSI’s”) debt
restructuring was not specific and therefore not countervailable; and
(2) affirming Commerce’s decision not to investigate United States
239
Steel Corporation’s (“U.S. Steel’s”) allegation of equity infusions.
230. See id. at 1351 (addressing the argument because it was dispositive as to the
appeal).
231. 74 F.3d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the decision was not based on a
distinction in the type of error but the timeliness of the request for correction).
232. 334 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that Commerce was not absolutely
required by either statute or regulation to correct “clerical” errors made by the
importer because the statute and regulation govern only actions by Commerce, not
the importer).
233. See Timken, 434 F.3d at 1351 (rejecting the government’s contention that
once Commerce calculated the dumping margin, errors in underlying data could
only be corrected where the error was clerical).
234. Id. at 1353.
235. Id. at 1356.
236. Id. at 1354-57 (concluding that Timken failed to provide sufficient,
corroborated evidence of the alleged misrepresentations and that the
reclassifications were supported by Timken’s description of its own channels).
237. 436 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1332.
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In the same opinion, the Federal Circuit also reversed the CIT’s
holding “reversing Commerce’s decision to countervail the entire
240
amount of import duty exemptions . . . provided to SSI.”
The Federal Circuit first held that it was not unreasonable for
Commerce to compare the magnitudes of the restructured debts in
lieu of the extensive investigation proposed by U.S. Steel when
241
determining whether SSI’s debt restructuring was specific.
U.S.
Steel had argued that Commerce should compare the terms of each
loan before and after restructuring, while Commerce had
determined that such calculations were impracticable due to
242
difficulties in obtaining the necessary information.
Second, the Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence,
including a United Nations investment report supporting a steelmaking plant in Thailand, supported Commerce’s determination
that there was not “a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that SSI
received an equity infusion that provide[d] a countervailable
243
benefit.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit deferred to Commerce in holding that
the whole import duty exemption program was unreasonable because
it systematically allowed impermissible drawback of recoverable and
244
resaleable scrap. Commerce’s consideration of the reasonableness
of the program utilized generally acceptable accounting principles
used outside Thailand and the court therefore supported
Commerce’s decision to countervail the entire amount of import
245
duty exemptions.

240. Id.
241. See id. at 1336 (acknowledging the strength of U.S. Steel’s suggestion, but
reasoning that an analysis of the magnitude would be roughly proportional to the
benefits conferred).
242. Id. at 1335 (stating that U.S. Steel’s proposal would require Commerce first
to compare the interest rate and repayment schedule before and after the
restructuring to determine the benefit conferred and then compare the benefits
between companies and industries).
243. Id. at 1337 (dismissing U.S. Steel’s argument that the Royal Thai Government
“induced bidders to invest in an unequityworthy company” through substantial
subsidies).
244. Id. at 1339 (deferring to Commerce’s decision that a system that does not
separately account for recoverable and resaleable scrap is unreasonable in light of its
finding that the normal allowance of waste does not include allowing drawbacks for
such scrap).
245. Id. at 1340 (referring to 19 C.F.R. § 351.519(a)(4), which permits Commerce
to countervail the entire amount of the drawback unless the home country conforms
to certain procedures or applies a system that confirms which inputs are consumed
in the production of exported products and rejecting the Royal Thai Government’s
assertion that Commerce’s analysis of reasonableness should be based on accounting
practices in the home country).

BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER

1052

4/7/2007 11:13:26 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Vol. 56:4

246

In Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed
the CIT, holding that the CIT improperly failed to give priority to a
statutory provision regarding the choice of exchange rates in
antidumping investigations. In this case, Commerce conducted an
antidumping duty investigation in which, as part of its calculations of
a dumping margin, Commerce used the rupee-dollar exchange rate
on the date of a Viraj Group, Ltd. (“Viraj”) purchase order, which
Commerce determined to be the date of sale of the relevant subject
247
merchandise. The exchange rate selected did not take into account
the over ten percent devaluation of the rupee over the period of
248
investigation after the date of sale.
On appeal, the CIT disagreed
with Commerce’s choice of an exchange rate, finding the result to be
249
absurd.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. The court found that “[b]oth a
statute and a regulation provide specifically and clearly that, with
exceptions not relevant to this case, Commerce is to utilize an
250
exchange rate on the date of sale.” The Federal Circuit found that
concern over the accuracy of dumping margins could not compel
Commerce to ignore the unambiguous and specific statutory
mandate regarding the date of currency exchange rates for use in its
251
determinations.
Also of interest in this opinion, the Federal Circuit clarified that
the government had standing to file this appeal despite the fact that
the government had, in response to the CIT’s direction, issued a
252
remand determination that was affirmed by the CIT.
Thus, even
though the government’s decision was affirmed by the CIT, the court
found that a justiciable case or controversy existed, stating that “the
government prevailed only because it acquiesced and abandoned its
original position, which it had zealously advocated, and adopted
under protest a contrary position forced upon it by the court. Thus,

246. 343 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
247. See id. (citing Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States (Viraj I), 162 F. Supp. 2d 656
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2001)).
248. Id. at 1374.
249. Id. (citing Viraj I, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 662).
250. See id. at 1374-75 (discussing Chevron deference afforded first to an
unambiguous statute, then to agency interpretation, where interpretative issues exist
and citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b-1 (2000) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.415 (2002)).
251. Id. at 1375 (finding that Commerce’s sale-date exchange rate is more
accurate in achieving an accurate dumping margin than CIT’s purchase date
exchange rate).
252. Id. at 1375 (recalling the general rule that a judicial remand to an agency is
not final and therefore not appealable).
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in substance, the government is truly the non-prevailing party in this
253
case.”
254
In Tung Mung Development Co., Ltd., v. United States, the Federal
Circuit addressed whether Commerce was required to assess
antidumping duties on all exported merchandise of a foreign
producer at a single weighted average rate, even if some sales were
made by a reseller. Here, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT in
upholding Commerce’s decision not to use a single weighted average
rate.
In this case, the foreign producers sold some of their own
merchandise in the United States and also sold some of their
merchandise to a reseller, who sold the merchandise to its U.S.
255
customers.
In two antidumping investigations, Commerce
originally calculated a single weighted average rate, but on remand
calculated combination rates, whereby the foreign producers were
responsible only for their own dumping and not that of middlemen
256
resellers.
In so doing, Commerce adopted a knowledge-based
257
Under this standard, a foreign producer’s merchandise
standard.
that was not exported through a reseller would not be assessed duties
for the reseller’s dumping if Commerce had “no basis to believe or
suspect that the producer was aware or should have been aware that
the middleman would be likely to dump subject merchandise into the
258
United States.”
Commerce also stated that this was not a “settled
259
practice” due to its limited experience with middleman dumping.
On appeal, the court found that Commerce did not previously
have a settled practice in this area and that Commerce had

253. Id. at 1376 (arguing that the Finkelstein exception to the finality requirement
for appealing a decision applied to this case as the court held “accuracy in
antidumping margin determination is a goal that can override a specific statute”).
254. 354 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
255. Id. at 1374 (separating the transactions into three categories: “direct sales by
producers to United States customers, sales by producers to the middleman, and
sales by the middlemen to United States customers”).
256. Id. at 1379 (referring to the Supreme Court’s holding in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), that an agency could change
its practice or policy if it could give a reasoned analysis for doing so).
257. Id. at 1377.
258. Id. at 1377-78 (quoting Alleghany Ludlum Corp. v. United States, No. 99-0600369, slip op. at 3-4 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 28, 2001), and Tung Mung Dev. Co. v.
United States, No. 99-06-00457, slip op. at 3-4 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 28, 2001))
(rationalizing its standard by suggesting it would encourage producers to find
middlemen who would not dump into the United States while not penalizing
producers for such dumping where they were not responsible).
259. Id. at 1378.
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adequately explained why a combination rate was appropriate here.
The Federal Circuit also found that it was Commerce’s choice as to
the wisdom and efficiency of the use of a knowledge-based standard
261
in determining whether to calculate a combination rate.
Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT’s affirmance of Commerce’s
redetermination using a combination rate.
Senior Circuit Judge Friedman dissented in part, finding that the
prevailing parties were entitled to recover their costs of appeal under
262
Judge
rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Friedman issued a dissent on this minor issue due to his concern
about “what appears to me to be an increasing practice by the court
263
routinely to deny costs to the prevailing party.”
In a case involving how strictly Commerce must enforce its notice
264
regulation, PAM S.p.A v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed
the CIT’s judgment and held that rescission of a completed
administrative review is not a proper remedy for failure to serve a
request for administrative review on a party where the party does not
demonstrate substantial prejudice. In this case, the petitioner filed a
request for an administrative review, but failed to serve PAM, S.p.A.
(“PAM”), a foreign pasta producer, as required by 19 C.F.R.
265
§ 351.303(f)(3)(ii). Commerce subsequently published notice of its
initiation of the administrative review and listed PAM as a
respondent. During the review, PAM informed Commerce that it
had not been properly served, but did not request rescission of the
266
review.
Instead, PAM requested, and Commerce granted,
numerous extension requests in responding to Commerce’s
267
questionnaires. In interpreting Commerce’s notice regulation, the
Federal Circuit held that the CIT should have analyzed whether PAM
proved substantial prejudice, regardless of whether the regulation
260. See id. at 1380 (citing Commerce’s use of the combination rate in Fuel
Ethanol from Brazil; Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, 51 Fed.
Reg. 5,572 (Feb. 14, 1986)).
261. Id. at 1381 (deferring to Commerce’s decision regarding which calculation
method would be more efficient).
262. Id. at 1382 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (countering the majority’s argument,
which relied on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(a), that the awarding of
costs is discretionary as the relevant statute states “unless . . . the court orders
otherwise”).
263. Id. at 1382-83 (suggesting that costs should be awarded without regard to the
“merit of the losing party’s arguments or its financial situation”).
264. 463 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
265. See id. at 1347 (noting that the regulation at issue provides that: “[A]n
interested party that files with the Department a request for . . . an administrative
review . . . must serve a copy of the request on each exporter . . .”).
266. Id. at 1346.
267. Id. at 1346-47.
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conferred an important procedural benefit on foreign companies.
In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the Federal Circuit
found that no substantial prejudice was shown as a matter of law as
PAM received notice of the review only seventeen days after it should
have been served, was granted extensions during the review in excess
of seventeen days, and did not claim that it was impeded by the
service failure in its ability to respond to or defend its interests in the
269
review.
270
In Elkem Metals Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that
the CIT erred when it overturned Commerce’s exclusion of the valueadded tax (“VAT”) paid by a Brazilian producer on its production
271
inputs from constructed value. This appeal arose from Commerce’s
administrative review of an antidumping order of silicon metal from
272
Brazil for the period between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000.
In
this review, Commerce applied its policy “of making a case-by-case
inquiry as to whether an exporter/producer is able to fully offset its
273
VAT liability by using its VAT credits.” Under Commerce’s policy,
VAT is included as a cost for purposes of calculating constructed
value to the extent that an exporter/producer does not fully use the
274
VAT credits generated by export sales under Brazilian law.
Applying this policy, Commerce determined that the Brazilian
producer had fully recovered its outlays for VAT on inputs
corresponding to exported goods and, therefore, excluded the VAT
275
on the producer’s inputs from the constructed value calculation.
Based on the resulting constructed value, Commerce determined the
276
Brazilian producer’s dumping margin to be de minimis.
Following an appeal to the CIT by Elkem Metals Co. (“Elkem”), the
CIT held that Commerce “must include such internal taxes paid on
inputs in its calculation of constructed value” when the taxes are not
277
refunded or remitted upon exportation of the subject merchandise.
The CIT also found that the Brazilian producer’s use of VAT credits
to purchase inputs, as permitted under Brazilian law, “did not
268. Id. at 1348.
269. See id. at 1349 (explaining that the total amount of additional time that
Commerce granted to PAM “far exceeded” the seventeen days lost due to lack of
service).
270. 468 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
271. Id. at 797.
272. Id. at 798.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. (explaining that antidumping duties would not be assessed on
imported silicon because of the de minimis dumping margin).
277. Id. at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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constitute a remittance or refund upon exportation.” On remand,
Commerce recalculated constructed value pursuant to the CIT’s
directions and found that the producer’s dumping margin was higher
279
than at the time of the first remand, but still de minimis. The CIT
sustained Commerce’s redetermination.
Elkem appealed
Commerce’s decision to rely on the producer’s questionnaire
responses as a proper accounting for VAT, while Commerce (and the
producer) cross-appealed, arguing that VAT should have been
280
excluded from the constructed value calculation.
In accordance with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
281
Council, Inc., the Federal Circuit first reviewed the language of the
statutory provision regarding constructed value, 19 U.S.C.
282
§ 1677b(e).
The Federal Circuit found that under section
1677b(e), Commerce would be required to exclude Brazilian VAT
from constructed value if it were refunded or remitted upon export,
but that the statute includes no requirement that Commerce include
VAT not refunded or remitted upon export because Congress has not
283
Under the
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
second prong of the Chevron test, the Federal Circuit held that
Commerce’s policy of individual determinations regarding the extent
to which VAT is a cost was a reasonable interpretation of the
284
statute.
As a result, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT had
accorded Commerce insufficient deference regarding its policy of
excluding VAT from constructed value, and reversed and remanded
for further proceedings. Based on this decision, the Federal Circuit
285
also held Elkem’s appeal to be moot.
286
Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States involved the division of
authority between Commerce and Customs in implementing U.S.
287
countervailing duty law.
Here, Customs had collected
countervailing duties from Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. (“NHC”) at a
“deemed liquidated rate” ranging from about three percent to seven
percent instead of the proper countervailing duty rate of 2.02% as
calculated by Commerce during an administrative review of NHC’s
278. Id.
279. See id. at 799-800 (stating that the dumping margin was 0.48%).
280. Id. at 800.
281. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
282. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (2000) (describing the calculation of a constructed
value for imported merchandise); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
283. Elkem Metals, 468 F.3d at 801.
284. See id. at 802 (noting with approval that Commerce promulgated its policy on
the exclusion of VAT through note and comment rulemaking).
285. Id. at 803.
286. 472 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
287. Id. at 1348.
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288

1997 magnesium and magnesium alloy imports.
(“Deemed
liquidation” takes place if entries are not actually liquidated within six
months of the removal of suspension of liquidation when Commerce
instructs Customs about the proper countervailing duty rate following
an annual administrative review. As the court noted here “[w]hile
actual liquidation occurs at the rate instructed by Commerce,
deemed liquidation under [19 U.S.C.] § 1504(d) occurs at the
289
(sometimes higher, sometimes lower) cash deposit rate”). NHC did
not protest the overcharge by Customs, but instead sought a setoff of
the overcharge against duties due on its imports for 2001 through a
Commerce administrative review of NHC’s 2001 entries. Commerce
290
refused to grant the setoff, citing a lack of statutory authority. On
appeal, the CIT remanded to Commerce with instructions to grant
the setoff.
The Federal Circuit reversed. Citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (for
Commerce administrative reviews of subsidy determinations) and 19
U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5) (for Customs protests for liquidation errors), the
court noted that “the procedures for contesting an erroneous subsidy
calculation [made by Commerce] are different from those for
291
contesting an erroneous duty assessment [by Customs].”
While
Commerce determines the amount of any net countervailable subsidy
in an administrative review, it typically calculates the countervailing
duty rate based only on entries made during the one-year period of
292
the review.
Customs, on the other hand, liquidates entries and
collects the duty by applying the calculated rate to the value of the
293
entered merchandise.
The court noted that “[a] liquidation
decision itself is ‘final and conclusive’ as to all parties, including the
United States, unless protested with Customs, and this is so even if
the liquidation contains a ‘clerical error, mistake of fact, or other
294
inadvertence’ adverse to the importer.”
NHC argued that Commerce was required to take into account
Customs’ past liquidation errors because 19 U.S.C. § 1671 requires
the “duty imposed” to be “equal to the amount of the net
288. Id.
289. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000) (providing that “[a]ny entry . . . not liquidated by
the Customs Service within 6 months after receiving such notice shall be treated as
having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty
asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record”); Norsk Hydro, 472 F.3d at
1351.
290. Id. at 1358-59 (relying on 68 Fed. Reg. 53,962 (Sept. 15, 2003)).
291. Id. at 1350.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1351.
294. Id. at 1352.

BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER

1058

4/7/2007 11:13:26 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Vol. 56:4

295

countervailing subsidy.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed and held
that Commerce properly imposed the countervailing duties for 1997
when it entered an order instructing Customs about the 2.02% rate
for that period and it was entitled to assume that Customs would
296
follow its instructions. In addition, the court held that Commerce’s
refusal to consider the 1997 entries during its review of NHC’s 2001
entries was a permissible interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1675,
particularly as Commerce conducts its administrative reviews on an
annual basis, making it “duplicative and wasteful for later reviews to
297
revisit matters subject to review in prior PORs [periods of review].”
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed and remanded to the CIT so
that the setoff issued by Commerce at the direction of the CIT could
be vacated.
298
In Consolidated Bearings Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
found that the CIT was correct in its decision to find jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), and agreed with the CIT that the
exhaustion doctrine did not apply under the facts in this case
299
(although for a different reason than the CIT).
However, in
considering the merits, the court determined that the CIT erred in its
interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C), and vacated and
300
remanded the case for further proceedings.
In this case, Consolidated Bearings Co. (“Consolidated”)
challenged Commerce’s 1998 liquidation instructions directing
Customs to liquidate all entries of antifriction bearings from
Germany (which were subject to an antidumping duty order) that
were not liquidated by the instructions that Commerce issued in
301
1997. The 1997 instructions had implemented the final results of a
Commerce antidumping administrative review for participating
importers. Consolidated had purchased antifriction bearings from
Germany produced by FAG Kugelfischer Georg Schaefer KgaA
(“FAG”) from an unrelated reseller, and imported those bearings
302
into the United States between 1989 and 1997. Consolidated paid
cash deposits for antidumping duties based on the rates assigned to
FAG and did not participate in Commerce’s administrative review.
Under Commerce’s 1998 instructions, Customs liquidated
295. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2000); Norsk Hydro, 472 F.3d at 1358.
296. Id. at 1358.
297. Id. at 1361.
298. 348 F.3d 997 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
299. Id. at 999-1000 (differing as to whether the “pure question of law” provision
applies).
300. Id. at 1007-08.
301. Id. at 1001.
302. Id. at 1000.
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Consolidated’s entries at the cash deposit rate instead of at the
significantly lower rates for importers who participated in the
303
administrative review. Consolidated appealed to the CIT.
Here, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT had jurisdiction under
the CIT’s residual jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) because
Consolidated was not challenging Commerce’s final administrative
review results, which are reviewable only under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c),
but was instead seeking application of those final results to its entries
304
of antifriction bearings manufactured by FAG. The Federal Circuit
found that “an action challenging Commerce’s liquidation
instructions is not a challenge to the final results, but a challenge to
the ‘administration and enforcement’ of those final results” for which
305
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) grants jurisdiction. In a related holding, the
Federal Circuit found that Consolidated’s appeal should not be
dismissed for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, despite the
fact that Consolidated did not participate in the administrative
review, because Consolidated was challenging the liquidation
306
instructions and not the administrative review itself.
Regarding the merits of the appeal, the court found that 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a)(2)(C) required Commerce to apply its final administrative
review results to all entries covered by the review and that “[i]f the
review did not examine a particular importer’s transaction, then that
importer’s entries enjoy no statutory entitlement to the rates
307
established by the review.” Here, because the reseller that exported
the bearings to Consolidated was not covered by the review, the court
found that Consolidated’s imports were not within the scope of the
308
review or the 1997 instructions.
However, the Federal Circuit
remanded the case to the CIT for additional proceedings regarding
whether Commerce’s 1998 instructions arbitrarily departed from its
past practice. The court found that the CIT needed to supplement
the record for this case with a comparison of the 1998 instructions
with Commerce’s actions in similar circumstances before this case to
determine whether Commerce had a consistent past practice
regarding imports from unrelated resellers not covered by a review

303. Id. at 1001.
304. Id. at 1001-02.
305. Id. at 1002.
306. Id. at 1003-04 (noting that the record did not disclose a statutory or
regulatory provision that would have allowed a party to challenge Commerce’s
administrative review).
307. Id. at 1005-06.
308. Id. at 1006.
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and whether the 1998 instructions departed from this past practice
309
without reasonable explanation.
310
In Belgium v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed and
remanded the CIT’s denial of a request made by Arcelor, an importer
of stainless steel plate in coils (“SSPC”), for a preliminary injunction
to prevent Customs from liquidating certain entries in an appeal of
Commerce’s liquidation instructions. The CIT had denied Arcelor’s
request because it found that Arcelor failed to make a persuasive case
311
of irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits.
Arcelor mistakenly declared Belgium, instead of Germany, to be
312
the country of origin of its steel imports between 1998 and 2002.
SSCP from Belgium were subject to antidumping and countervailing
duties during that time. When Arcelor discovered the error, it filed
disclosures and timely protests with Customs to correct the country of
313
origin. Arcelor also disclosed the error to Commerce in the fourth
administrative review of the antidumping duty order of SSCP from
314
Belgium. Commerce determined that the correction of the country
of origin would apply to entries covered by the fourth review and
future entries, but not prior entries, and instructed Customs to
liquidate prior entries as though they were subject to the SSPC from
315
Belgium order.
Arcelor filed protests with Customs for the
liquidated entries and a complaint with the CIT regarding the
316
liquidation instructions for the unliquidated entries.
Arcelor also
317
requested a preliminary injunction, which the CIT denied.
On appeal regarding the denial of the injunction, the Federal
Circuit remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction. The Federal
Circuit first found that, while Commerce may turn out to be correct
in its conclusion that Arcelor’s “country-of-origin designations were
applicable only to entries in the fourth administrative review period
and later” regardless of whether or not they were liquidated, the issue
was not “so clear cut” that the court was ready to dispose of the
318
appeal based on a lack of likelihood of success on the merits.
Regarding the balance of hardships, the Federal Circuit found that
309. Id. at 1008.
310. 452 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
311. Ugine & ALZ Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289-90
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2005), rev’d and remanded, 452 F.3d at 1297.
312. Belgium, 452 F.3d at 1290-91.
313. Id. at 1291.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1295.

BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER

2007

4/7/2007 11:13:26 AM

2006 INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUMMARY

1061

there was no strong public interest against injunctive relief. The
court then determined that Arcelor had made “a strong showing of
irreparable harm” because the denial of a preliminary injunction
could result in a denial of any opportunity for a decision on the
319
merits of its claim.
Finally, in remanding for the entry of a
preliminary injunction, the court also stated that it gave strong weight
to the fact that all parties had consented to a preliminary injunction
320
before the CIT denied the injunction.
In a non-precedential opinion involving a Commerce antidumping
321
duty determination, Agro Dutch Industries Ltd. v. United States, the
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings the
CIT’s dismissal of a case appealing the final results of an antidumping
322
duty administrative review on jurisdictional grounds.
The CIT
originally dismissed the case because the plaintiff had not responded
to the court’s request for information about whether any entries of
the subject merchandise for the period of review remained
323
unliquidated.
While Agro Dutch Industries, Ltd. had filed an
appeal and been granted an injunction against liquidation of its
entries, the injunction was not effective before Customs “liquidated
many of the shipments that had entered the United States during the
324
period of review.”
The Federal Circuit found that the parties
agreed that there remained unliquidated entries from the affected
period (and that the CIT had not imposed a deadline on its request
for information about the entries) and, as a result, found that “the
jurisdictional ground on which the trial court initially dismissed the
325
action cannot stand.” The Federal Circuit remanded to the CIT to
address the complaint on the merits. While the CIT had indicated
that it was prepared to dispose of the case on the merits, in favor of
the government, the Federal Circuit found that that discussion was
not an alternative ground for decision by the CIT and therefore
326
remanded to the CIT for further proceedings.
B. United States International Trade Commission
The United States International Trade Commission’s (“ITC’s”)
area of expertise and responsibility in unfair trade cases, including
319. Id. at 1297.
320. Id.
321. 167 F. App’x 202 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
322. Id. at 204-05.
323. Id. at 203.
324. Id. at 202.
325. Id. at 204.
326. Id. at 205 (remanding the case to the same trial court judge, notwithstanding
Agro Dutch’s protestations).
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antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and reviews, is
327
the injury determination. More specifically, in an antidumping or
countervailing duty investigation, the ITC must determine whether a
U.S. industry is materially injured, or is threatened with material
injury, by imports or sales of the subject merchandise, or whether
imports or sales of the subject merchandise have materially retarded
328
the establishment of a U.S. industry. Without an affirmative injury
determination from the ITC, Commerce cannot issue an
antidumping or countervailing duty order.
While the ITC had relatively few unfair trade cases before the
Federal Circuit in 2003 through 2006 compared with Commerce and
Customs, several cases involving the ITC—most notably Nippon Steel
329
330
Corp. v. United States and Bratsk Aluminium Smelter v. United States —
were among the most interesting and potentially far-reaching trade
cases decided by the court during this period.
Nippon Steel is a case with a long procedural history, including four
determinations by the ITC, four opinions from the CIT, and one
331
Prior to this 2006 Federal Circuit
prior Federal Circuit opinion.
opinion, the ITC had ultimately issued, under protest, a negative
332
material injury determination upon instruction from the CIT. The
issue in this appeal was whether the ITC’s findings that dumping of
Japanese imports of tin- and chromium-coated steel sheets (“TCCSS”)
could be linked to price effects in, and causation of injury to, the
domestic market such that the findings detracted from the evidence
in support of injury as to render the ITC’s affirmative material injury
333
determination unsupported by substantial evidence.
Here, the
Federal Circuit found that the ITC’s original affirmative material
injury determination was supported by substantial evidence, and

327. See, e.g., Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that Congress bifurcates the inquiry into
antidumping allegations between Commerce and the ITC).
328. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000).
329. 458 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
330. 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
331. 458 F.3d at 1347-50 (engaging in a “cursory” overview of the procedural
history, citing the following cases: Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 182 F. Supp.
2d 1330 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (Nippon I); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 223 F.
Supp. 2d 1349 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (Nippon II); Nippon Steel Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Nippon III); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United
States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (Nippon IV); Nippon Steel Corp. v.
United States, 2005 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 40 (Mar. 23, 2005) (Nippon V)).
332. Id. at 1348.
333. Id. at 1347-48.
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therefore reversed the CIT and directed it to reinstate the original
334
affirmative ITC determination.
In evaluating the ITC’s analysis of the record evidence and the
CIT’s holdings, the Federal Circuit found that, while it supported the
CIT’s rejection of evidence of price effects containing
miscalculations, it could not support the CIT’s rejection of the ITC’s
335
analysis of certain domestic producer accounting data. In addition,
the Federal Circuit found that there was substantial evidence on both
sides of the issue of whether domestic producers were in a cost-price
squeeze, and that the statutory substantial evidence standard
required that the ITC’s conclusion that the domestic industry was in a
336
As a result, the Federal
cost-price squeeze be given deference.
Circuit could not support the CIT’s conclusion regarding domestic
price suppression. Similarly, the Federal Circuit could not support
the CIT’s rejections of ITC findings regarding conditions of
competition in the domestic industry because it did not agree with
the CIT that the ITC’s conditions of competition findings were
337
unreasonable in light of the evidence as a whole.
The Federal
Circuit also concluded that the CIT “improperly substituted its own
credibility determinations for those of the Commission” regarding
338
causation.
In making these conclusions, although noting that the
CIT “may well have conducted a better analysis than did the
Commission, and that we would have reached the same conclusion as
339
the trade court if deciding the case in the first instance,” the
Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he assessment of the proper weight to
accord to testimony is within the role of the Commission, not this
340
court and not the Court of International Trade.”
As the Federal
Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s original
affirmative material injury determination, it did not decide the scope
of the CIT’s authority to reverse an ITC determination without
341
remand.
342
In Bratsk Aluminium Smelter v. United States, the Federal Circuit
vacated the CIT’s decision affirming the ITC’s determination that the
334. Id. at 1354 (acknowledging, however, that substantial evidence existed to
support the CIT’s findings).
335. Id. at 1353-54.
336. Id. at 1354.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1357.
339. Id. at 1358.
340. Id. at 1356.
341. Id. at 1359 (explaining that the authority to reverse would come from 19
U.S.C. § 1516(a), which outlines the provisions for judicial review in countervailing
duty and antidumping proceedings).
342. 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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domestic silicon metal industry was materially injured by reason of
Russian silicon metal imports sold at less than fair value. In making
an affirmative injury determination in an antidumping investigation,
the ITC must determine both that the domestic industry is suffering
from present material injury and that the material injury is “by reason
of” the imports under consideration during the investigation
343
(“subject imports”).
This appeal dealt with whether the ITC
properly established that the domestic industry was injured “by
344
In considering the “by reason of”
reason of” the subject imports.
requirement, the Federal Circuit clarified its earlier decision in Gerald
345
Metals, Inc. v. United States.
During its injury investigation in Bratsk, the ITC had not made a
specific determination regarding whether non-subject imports of
silicon metal, a commodity product, would simply replace subject
imports if the subject imports were excluded from the U.S. market.
The ITC had also dismissed Gerald Metals as factually
346
distinguishable.
The CIT affirmed the ITC’s decision without
347
specifically discussing the causation issue.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first noted that
[w]here commodity products are at issue and fairly traded, pricecompetitive, non-subject imports are in the market, the
Commission must explain why the elimination of subject imports
would benefit the domestic industry instead of resulting in the nonsubject imports’ replacement of the subject imports’ market share
348
without any beneficial impact on domestic producers.

The Court clarified that
[u]nder Gerald Metals, the increase in volume of subject imports
priced below domestic products and the decline in the domestic
market share are not in and of themselves sufficient to establish
causation . . . . [U]nder Gerald Metals, the Commission is required
to make a specific causation determination and in that connection
to directly address whether non-subject imports would have
replaced the subject imports without any beneficial effect on
349
domestic producers.

The Federal Circuit expressed its concern that the ITC had not
explained its causation analysis in accordance with Gerald Metals,
instead limiting that case to its “unique facts.” The Federal Circuit
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1372.
132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1373-74.
Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1372.
See id. (affirming the Commission’s remand determination “in its entirety”).
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1374-75.
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raised this concern despite the fact that this case, like Gerald Metals,
involved an interchangeable product with significant non-subject
imports sold at prices generally below domestic product prices during
350
the period of investigation. Here, the court clarified that
[t]he Commission is obligated to follow the holdings of our cases,
not to limit those decisions to their particular facts. The holding of
Gerald Metals is not limited to situations in which non-subject
imports increased during the period of review. The obligation
under Gerald Metals is triggered whenever the antidumping
investigation is centered on a commodity product, and price
competitive non-subject imports are a significant factor in the
351
market.

The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the CIT so that it could
remand back to the ITC to address whether the non-subject imports
would have replaced subject imports and continued to cause injury to
the domestic industry if subject imports were excluded from the U.S.
352
market.
Senior Circuit Judge Archer dissented, finding that the ITC had
“adequately considered” the effect of subject and non-subject imports
and that “neither the statute nor Gerald Metals imposes the rigidity in
353
findings or analysis that the majority seems to require.”
354
Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States, involved an exception to the
general rule under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i) that the ITC must
cumulate imports from all countries subject to an injury investigation
when analyzing the volume, price, effect, and impact of subject
imports. In particular, Caribbean Ispat Limited’s (“CIL’s”) appeal
focused on the application of the exception mandated by the
355
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”),
which
exempts Caribbean nations from the cumulation rule, to the ITC’s
investigation of imports of steel wire rod from Trinidad and
356
Tobago.
The ITC took the position, upheld by the CIT, that the ITC was
prohibited from considering the effect of subject imports from nonCBERA countries when determining whether the domestic industry
was materially injured “by reason of” imports from Trinidad and
357
Tobago.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “the
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id. at 1376.
Id. at 1376, 1378.
450 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(ii)(III) (1996).
Caribbean Ispat, I450 F.3d at 1337.
Id. at 1337.
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Commission had authority to treat LTFV [less than fair value]
imports from non-CBERA countries as an ‘other economic factor,’
just as the Commission ordinarily treats fairly traded imports as an
‘other economic factor’ in dumping investigations that do not involve
358
CBERA countries.” Citing its recent decision in Bratsk, the Federal
Circuit also held that the ITC was required in this case to make a
specific causation determination and address directly whether other
imports (whether or not subject to the investigation) would have
replaced Trinidad and Tobago’s imports without any positive effect
359
on domestic producers. Therefore, the court remanded for further
360
consideration of the causation analysis.
361
In Altx, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s
decisions. The court found that the CIT did not abuse its discretion
when it remanded the Commission’s first remand determination in
the appeal and also held that CIT’s second remand determination
362
was supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
This case involved an antidumping investigation of circular
363
seamless stainless steel hollow products (“CSSSHP”) from Japan. In
its original investigation, the ITC found that the domestic CSSSHP
industry was not materially injured or threatened with material injury
by reason of subject imports during the period of investigation, and
364
issued a negative determination. On appeal, the CIT remanded to
the ITC to consider the relevant arguments of the domestic
365
In its first remand, the ITC entered an affirmative
producers.
determination of injury after a new member of the ITC joined the
366
original dissent.
The Japanese producers then appealed and the
CIT again remanded to the ITC for additional consideration of
367
arguments by the parties.
On second remand, the ITC reinstated
its original negative determination, again without any Commissioner
changing its vote, as the temporary appointment of the
Commissioner who had provided the decisive vote on remand
expired, and also addressed the arguments of domestic producers in
368
The CIT affirmed the second remand
greater depth.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
370 F.3d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
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determination as it found that the ITC had addressed significant
arguments and evidence undermining its reasoning and
369
conclusions.
Here, while the court’s jurisdiction attached as a result of the CIT’s
370
final decision affirming the second remand determination, the
Federal Circuit noted that its jurisdiction “nonetheless encompasses
the entirety of the proceedings before the court, including
intermediate remand orders that would not, independently, be
371
appealable.”
The court found that it appropriately would review
the CIT’s earlier decisions in this case under an “abuse of discretion”
standard because the remand decisions did not evaluate the
substantiality of the ITC’s evidence, but instead simply requested
372
further explanation. The court reviewed the CIT’s final decision de
novo in considering whether the ITC’s final remand determination
373
was supported by “substantial evidence.”
In reviewing the CIT’s decisions, the Federal Circuit found that the
CIT’s decision to remand after the first remand determination was
justified due to the ITC’s “deficient treatment” of certain areas of
374
evidence, including non-subject imports.
As a result, the Federal
Circuit did not reach the argument about whether the first remand
375
Regarding
determination was supported by substantial evidence.
the second remand determination, the Federal Circuit held that the
376
ITC’s views were supported by substantial evidence.
The court
found that the ITC was within its discretion to refuse to conform its
decision to a theoretical economic model found to be inconsistent
377
with empirical data.
The court also found that the ITC’s findings
regarding non-subject imports were supported by substantial
evidence and that the ITC “is not required to determine that nonsubject imports are significant in order to conclude that the subject
378
imports are not significant.” Finally, the Federal Circuit also found
that the ITC’s decision to reject semi-annual data and rely solely on
annual data was reasonable where there was a risk that the semi379
annual data was “incomplete, unrepresentative, or inaccurate.”
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1119-20.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124.
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III. OTHER TRADE CASES
A. United States Trade Representative and Presidential Trade Authority
380

In Gilda Industries, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the CIT’s decision.
This case involved a December 1985 prohibition by the European
Community (“EC”) of imports of meat from animals treated with
381
hormones.
The United States challenged the prohibition at the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and ultimately received
authorization by the WTO to increase its duties on EC products in
382
response to the prohibition.
Following the WTO’s ruling and
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2416, the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”) created a “retaliation list,” which subjected certain EC
383
products to increased duties of one hundred percent ad valorem.
Included on the list was HTSUS subheading 9903.02.35 for “[r]usks,
384
toasted bread and similar products.”
Gilda Industries, Inc.
(“Gilda”), which imports toasted breads from Spain, appealed
385
USTR’s retaliation list under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
The Federal
Circuit confirmed that jurisdiction was available under that provision
because Gilda was appealing USTR’s action and not Customs’
386
classification of the entries.
Gilda first argued that retaliation lists may include only products
affected by the foreign country’s noncompliance with the WTO’s
387
ruling (“reciprocal goods”). The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding
that, while the retaliation list must include reciprocal goods, it could
388
also include nonreciprocal goods. The Federal Circuit also rejected
Gilda’s argument that the list had expired because no domestic
industry that “benefits from” the list had requested its continuation
since the domestic beef industry had requested continuation and that
industry benefits from any pressure the list places on foreign
389
governments to comply with the WTO ruling.

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

446 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1274.
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Id. at 1275.
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Id. at 1275-76.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277.
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Gilda also argued that the USTR had failed to comply with 19
U.S.C. § 2416(b)(2)(C), which requires the USTR to review and
revise the list every 180 days because the USTR had not revised the
390
list since its implementation in July 1999. While the Federal Circuit
questioned Gilda’s standing to challenge this provision under the
“zone of interests” test because Gilda could be seen as seeking relief
391
that would frustrate the objectives of the statute, the Federal Circuit
did not reach this question because the government waived the
392
argument by not raising it in its brief. The Federal Circuit instead
remanded this issue to the CIT to determine whether the USTR had
determined that resolution of the hormone dispute is “imminent”—a
determination which would have excused USTR from the
393
requirement to review and revise the list. However, the court also
found that Gilda is not entitled to a refund of duties paid or removal
of its products from the list regardless of whether the USTR had
complied with its duties to review and revise the list because the only
394
remedy available is for the list to be reviewed and revised.
The
Federal Circuit also ruled that Gilda was entitled to notice and the
395
opportunity to comment only when the list was originally created.
Finally, the Federal Circuit also ruled that Gilda could not
challenge the implementation of the list on the ground that it
violates the WTO’s recommendation by collecting duties in excess of
those authorized by the WTO because WTO decisions are not
binding on U.S. courts and 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B) provides that
no person other than the United States may challenge any action or
inaction of the U.S. government on the ground that it is inconsistent
396
with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
In a case involving Presidential trade authority, Motions Systems
397
Corp. v. Bush, the Federal Circuit addressed the President’s decision
not to grant import relief to the U.S. pedestal actuator industry under
section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000. Section 421
established procedures for import relief by the President in the form
of increased duties or other import restrictions by U.S. industries
threatened by “market disruption” resulting from increased imports
398
of products from China.
390.
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392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
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398.
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In this case, Motion Systems Corporation (“Motion Systems”)
properly filed a petition with the ITC alleging that imports of Chinese
pedestal actuators had increased rapidly during 2000-2002, resulting
399
in market disruption.
The ITC conducted an investigation, made
an affirmative finding of market disruption, and recommended that
the President impose a quantitative restriction on the subject imports
400
for a three-year period.
However, the President exercised his
discretion under the statute not to impose any relief, finding that
such relief would only cause imports to shift to other offshore
sources, and that any benefit to the domestic industry would be
outweighed by the increased cost to downstream users and
401
consumers.
Motion Systems sued the President and the USTR at the CIT
402
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
After the CIT found in
favor of the defendants, Motion Systems appealed to the Federal
403
Circuit.
In an en banc decision, the Federal Circuit found that
there was no right of judicial review to challenge the acts of the
404
President or USTR in this case. With no explicit statutory cause of
action in section 421, the issue became whether Motion Systems
could challenge the President’s discretionary actions under section
421 as outside the scope of authority delegated to the President by
405
Congress.
The Federal Circuit determined that, under Dalton v.
406
Specter, there is no right of judicial review available because section
421 committed the decision about import relief to the discretion of
the President, despite placing some limits on that discretion, and the
407
President’s duties under section 421 were not purely ministerial.
The Federal Circuit also held that the CIT lacked jurisdiction to
review the USTR’s actions because they were not final actions, but
408
merely recommendations for Presidential action. In a concurring
opinion, Circuit Judge Gajarsa disagreed with the majority’s
determination of no right to judicial review, finding that “it is the
judiciary’s role, and its duty, to review whether the President acted
409
within the statutory parameters.”
In reviewing the merits of this
399.
400.
401.
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405.
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case, Judge Gajarsa would have affirmed the CIT on the merits as he
agreed with the CIT that there was “no basis to conclude that the
President’s decision is based on a ‘clear misunderstanding of the
governing statute’ or that it constituted ‘action outside his delegated
410
authority.’”
B. Trade Adjustment Assistance
411

In Steen v. United States,
the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s
decision denying trade adjustment cash benefits to Ron Steen. Mr.
Steen had applied to the Department of Agriculture for cash benefits
under the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (“Trade Act”), which
provides for trade adjustment assistance for U.S. workers, including
“agricultural commodity producers,” harmed by competition from
412
imports.
Under the Trade Act, producers may, among other
413
In order to receive a benefit,
things, apply for a cash benefit.
however, producers must meet certain requirements, including that
the producer’s “net farm income (as determined by the Secretary)
for the most recent year is less than the producer’s net farm income
for the latest year in which no adjustment assistance was received by
414
the producer.” The regulations implementing the Trade Act clarify
that that fishermen may also apply for assistance and that all
producers must certify, among other things, that their “net farm or
fishing income for the most recent tax year was less than that during
415
the producer’s pre-adjustment year.”
Mr. Steen applied for cash benefits under the Trade Act as a
416
fisherman of Pacific salmon.
The Agriculture Department denied
Mr. Steen’s application because he failed to show that his net fishing
417
income in 2002 was lower than his net fishing income in 2001. Mr.
Steen appealed to the CIT, arguing that his net fishing income
should be calculated with respect to Pacific salmon (the imported
product) only, and not with respect to income from other
418
commercial fishing activity.
The CIT and the Federal Circuit
disagreed. The CIT and the Federal Circuit found that the term “net
farm income” in the Trade Act includes (for fishermen) net income
from all fishing activity based on a plain meaning of the term, the
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

Id. at 1375.
468 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1358 (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2321 (2004)).
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goals that Congress intended the statute to promote (namely, to
adjust production to avoid the impact of competing imported goods),
and the Agriculture Department’s reasonable definition of the
419
term.
Therefore, as Mr. Steen’s net farm income from all fishing
activities was higher in 2002 than his net fishing income in 2001, the
Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s decision upholding the Agriculture
420
Department’s denial of cash benefits for Mr. Steen.
In Former Employees of Quality Fabricating, Inc. v. United States Secretary
421
of Labor, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT did not possess
jurisdiction to consider the Department of Labor’s (“Labor’s”)
determination on secondarily-affected worker benefit eligibility for
422
former employees of Quality Fabricating, Inc. (“Quality”).
Secondarily-affected workers are workers whose employers were
indirectly affected by increased imports from or shifts of production
423
to other countries. In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the
CIT lacked jurisdiction to review Labor’s determination because the
CIT did not have jurisdiction to review all of Labor’s determinations,
administration, and enforcement of trade adjustment assistance
certifications, and “no statute waives immunity nor authorizes suit in
the court of International Trade with respect to Labor’s
424
determinations on secondarily-affected worker benefits.”
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit addressed a wide range of international trade
issues during 2003-2006 and, in so doing, clarified trade practice and
law involving matters before Customs, Commerce, the ITC and
USTR, as well as for the CIT. Interestingly, in reviewing the cases
summarized above, the Federal Circuit more often affirmed the CIT
in this period in cases involving Customs than in cases involving
Commerce or the ITC, perhaps reflecting the relative complexity and
extensive procedural history of some of the Commerce and ITC
unfair trade cases in comparison with the Customs matters addressed
by the CIT and Federal Circuit during this period. Overall, the
Federal Circuit issued well-reasoned and thoughtful decisions
involving international trade during 2003-2006, with many of those
decisions likely to have an important impact on the practice of
international trade law in the years to come.
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420.
421.
422.
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